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Abstract 
 
Non-union direct voice has replaced union representative voice as the primary avenue 
for employee voice in the British private sector. This paper explains this development by 
providing a framework for examining the relationship between employee voice and 
workplace outcomes. Voice is associated with lower voluntary turnover, especially in the 
case of union voice.  However, union voice is also associated with greater workplace 
conflict. We argue changes in voice in Britain are not best understood using a simple 
union/non-union dichotomy. Union effects on workplace outcomes and the incidence of 
HRM hinge on whether it co-exists at the workplace with non-union voice in what we 
term a ‘dual’ system. In the first part of the 21st Century these dual voice systems were 
performing at least as well as non-union only regimes, suggesting that the rise of non-
union regimes is attributable to something other than clear  comparative performance 
advantages over other forms of voice. 
   
JEL: J24; J51; J52; J53; J63  
Key Words: employee voice; productivity; industrial action; quits; labor-management 
relations 
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1. Introduction 
 
In the last quarter century, there was a dramatic shift in the forms of employee voice in 
British private sector workplaces, with non-union voice growing and union voice 
contracting. However, the overall coverage of voice mechanisms remained high and 
stable (Millward et al., 2000; Willman et al., 2009). During this period there was virtually 
no statute constraining employers’ choice of voice within establishments.  British 
employers were thus free to choose union or non-union voice, or to combine them. They 
could have chosen to have no voice mechanisms at all; they did not do so, but chose 
non-union voice. 
 
In this paper, we examine and seek to explain this pattern of change. Specifically we 
address the argument that the reason non-union voice grew is that, alone or in 
combination with union voice, it yields net benefits to employers. These benefits may 
take two forms; first, performance outcomes and, second, the ability to implement 
human resource management practices. We find some evidence to support the 
contention that the presence of non–union voice offers comparative advantages over 
union-only voice and no voice at all. However, the combination of non-union voice and 
union voice, whilst offering benefits in terms of lower quits and higher HRM incidence, 
has not prevented its demise as a voice regime in Britain. 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. First, we identify the full set of voice options that 
exist within workplaces.  Section 2 then documents change in voice regimes in private 
sector workplaces 1980-2004 and identifies their association with performance 
outcomes that, either directly or indirectly, enter into the cost-benefit decision of the firm.  
Section 3 develops hypotheses linking forms of voice and workplace outcomes and 
practices. Section 4 does the same for HRM practices. Section 5 describes the data and 
methods. Sections 6 and 7 present the results. Section 8 concludes.  
 
 
2. Patterns of Voice Provision 
 
We follow Hirschman in seeing voice as “any attempt at all to change, rather than to 
escape from, an objectionable state of affairs…… through appeal to a higher authority 
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with the intention of forcing a change…. the initial assumption is a decline in the 
performance of a firm or organization which is remediable provided the attention of 
management is sufficiently focused on the task”. (1970, p30-1). In this conception, voice 
involves management-employee dialogue over organizational improvement and below 
we proxy this by measures of two-way communication involving both parties and/or their 
representatives.  It may be individual or collective, union or non-union.  We distinguish 
voice regimes and voice types. A voice regime refers to the mix between union and non-
union voice; regimes can take on union and non-union forms and combinations thereof.  
Voice can also be decomposed into representative and direct voice types. Union voice is 
always a representative type. Non-union voice can take on both representative (such as 
independent works councils or joint consultative committees) and direct forms (such as 
team briefings with no intermediary). Regimes and types may mix at establishment level; 
for example, what we term dual channel voice mixes union and non-union forms and 
may mix direct and representative types (see also Dundon et al., 2004; Mironi 2010). We 
also identify no voice workplaces in which two-way communication mechanisms are 
absent.  We turn to a brief description of the coverage of these categories. 
 
2.1 Voice  
Figure 1 shows changes in voice in Britain for the private sector. The proportion of 
workplaces with voice increased from about 76 percent in 1984 to 82 percent in 2004. 
The no-voice rate between 1984 and 1998 remained constant at about 25 percent; it fell 
to 18 percent in 2004.  
 
2.2 Voice Regimes 
Figure 1 also demonstrates the growing share of non-union voice from 1984 to 2004. 
The most common form of voice at the start of period was dual channel at 30 percent. 
By the end, non-union only voice constituted 56 percent of all private sector workplace 
voice regimes in Britain. This stands in sharp contrast with the decline in union only 
voice (18 percent to 4 percent between 1984 and 2004) and dual channel voice (30 
percent to 19 percent over the same period).  
 
- Figure 1-  
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2.3 Voice Types 
The incidence of voice types has also changed. From Figure 2 and Table 1, we see that 
the decline in representative voice occurred in both dual and non-union regimes.  For 
instance, the percentage of workplaces with a joint consultative committee (JCC) 
meeting once a month fell from 26 percent to 15 percent by the end of the period. 
Though there was a small increase in non-union representation at the workplace, the 
decline in JCC’s suggests that representative voice -- in both its union and non-union 
forms -- suffered a substantial decline in the private sector from 1984 to 2004.  
 
-Table 1- 
- Figure 2- 
  
By contrast, direct voice types have been either constant or increasing in coverage since 
1984.  The incidence of team briefings has more than doubled (31 percent at the start of 
the period rising to 70 by the end).  Regular meetings with senior management became 
more prevalent over the period 1984-1990 and have stabilised since.1  On the whole, 
however, the decline in JCC’s has been gradual whereas the incidence of direct voice 
rose dramatically.  
 
2.4  Summary 
Voice coverage is as extensive in 2004 as 1984, but both voice regimes and voice types 
have changed substantially over the same period. Theories of union decline in Britain 
have often focused on employer opposition, macro-economic environment (high-
unemployment in the 1980s to early 1990s period and low inflation) and politics (an 
unfavourable legislative and social climate over the period prior to Labour’s election in 
1997 (Kelly 1998)). Theories of union decline, however, are not theories about the rise of 
non-union voice. Direct voice is replacing representative voice in the private sector, 
whether that representative voice is union or not.  Examining why direct forms of voice 
have replaced representative forms could hold the key to understanding the rise of non-
union voice.   
                                                 
1
 The time-series on problem-solving groups is problematic because questions are not consistent. 
Efforts to construct a more consistent series for the period 1998-2004 suggest modest growth in 
their use (Kersley et al., 2006: 93-94). 
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3.  Voice and Workplace Outcomes.  
By 2004, the primary suppliers of workplace voice in Britain were employers. In a 
voluntarist environment such as Britain, this shift suggests first, that voice provides 
benefits to employers and, second, that the returns to different voice regimes and types 
for employers were changing.  If some voice regimes and types are associated with 
better outcomes such as higher labor productivity, then workplaces may, over time, 
substitute “successful” voice for “unsuccessful” voice.  We adopt a simple cost-benefit 
approach in which the employer adoption of any voice regime or type is based on 
positive net benefits, and the choice of a particular voice regime or type is based on 
comparative voice performance (Willman et al 2007)..  
 
The precedent for this approach is Freeman and Medoff (1984) who empirically tested 
propositions about the relationship between union voice and five workplace outcomes: 
profitability, labor productivity, labor turnover, industrial action and the climate of 
industrial relations. During the 1970s and early 1980s in the USA, workplaces with 
unions tended to have lower quit rates, higher productivity, and more labor unrest than 
non-unionised firms.  These findings appear to be robust (Bennett and Kaufman, 2007), 
although the links between unions and labor productivity remain contested (Black and 
Lynch, 2004).   
 
However, there is little empirical or theoretical research on the impacts of different voice 
regimes (i.e., union vs. non-union) on workplace-level outcomes, even less on voice 
types (i.e., direct vs. representative).  The empirical work tends to focus on outcomes for 
workers, and indicates that there are substantial benefits accruing to workers from non-
union voice (Bryson, 2004).    
 
Since we view non-union voice as an investment in workers by firms, we should see 
returns to that investment relative to no voice, at least among ‘like’ workplaces that are 
observationally equivalent.  In this section, we specify the expected direction of the voice 
and outcome variable relations and describe the form of the exit-voice model suitable for 
empirical testing. 
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3.1 Worker Exit and Voice Regimes 
The extent of voluntary labor turnover (i.e., quits) in a given workplace is influenced by 
the presence of a voice regime . With a standard equation (with turnover as our 
workplace outcome variable) the voluntary turnover rate (LT) is: 
 
[1]                                              LTit  =  a it +  b1V it + b2X it + e. 
 
Here a is the baseline turnover rate for workplace i at time t, V is the voice variable that 
in all specifications is categorical and has as the omitted reference category ‘no-voice’ 
and can be run in two specifications in which the voice categories are either the three 
voice regimes (union, non-union and dual) or voice types (direct, representative, direct 
and representative), X is the vector of control variables that includes observable 
workplace characteristics such as industry, region, foreign ownership, age of 
establishment, single establishment status, workforce composition (percentage of 
females, non-manuals and part-timers), and workplace size. 
 
Focusing on V as our voice variable we can deduce expected signs of the co-efficient(s) 
with respect to quit rates. All voice categories are expected to have negative coefficients, 
b1<0 with respect to our excluded reference category (no voice) as a workplace with 
voice is expected to display lower exit than a workplace without. Across V categories, 
however, we would expect the strength of this association to vary systematically by  
voice regime and type.   
 
Union voice is more difficult for a firm to jettison and the collective and independent 
nature of union voice provides public goods to union members. As such, union voice 
(both union only and dual forms) will display the lowest turnover rates whereas non-
union voice is less embedded and provides fewer public goods, and hence less likely to 
reduce turnover.2 The exit-voice hypothesis therefore implies that i) the presence of 
voice is likely to lead to less exit and that ii) more embedded forms of voice will be 
associated with lower exit. As dual voice contains both union and non-union voice side-
                                                 
2
 Union membership is associated with a wage premium (Blanchflower and Bryson, 2007), 
structured promotional opportunities, greater on the job training and seniority rules that 
encourage longer tenure. 
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by-side, it seems the least likely form of voice to be jettisoned by a firm and hence the 
most likely to discourage  exit. Our expected ranking of voice coefficients is therefore: 
  
[2]         LT it =b1 [(Dual Voice<Union Voice < Non-Union Voice) it <(No Voice) it]. 
 
We expect this relation to be fairly robust over time. This may not be the case with 
respect to other workplace outcomes discussed below. 
 
 3.2  Industrial Climate and Industrial Action  
The exit-voice hypothesis implies a positive association with industrial action and poor 
perceptions of workplace climate. The lack of voice encourages exit, and the exit option 
reduces observed conflict inside the workplace. Unlike exit-voice, our climate and 
conflict measures will be more directly affected by legislation (e.g., laws preventing work 
stoppage in certain industries would lower measures of conflict such as strikes despite 
voice presence) and other external changes to the labor market (e.g., rising prices that 
could fuel demands for higher wages).  Hence we would not expect these outcomes to 
be as stable as labor turnover in their coefficient estimates year-to-year. To allow for this 
we estimate both climate (CL) and industrial action (IA) separately as in equation (1) : 
[3]                                              CLit  =  a it +  b1V it + b2X it + e 
and, 
[4]                                              IAit  =  a it +  b1V it + b2X it + e. 
This formulation in eq. [4] for industrial action would have the opposite sign 
expectation(s) to our exit measure.  
 
The effects of voice versus no voice workplaces on climate (CL) may not be so clear. On 
the one hand no voice may well engender worse feelings than any voice, but it could 
increase exit to offset any declines in workplace climate. Thus we expect our voice 
regime coefficients with respect to industrial action to be: 
 
[5]   IA it =b1 [(Union Voice >Dual Voice> Non-Union Voice it ) > (No Voice) it], 
 
For good climate we see the pattern running in the other direction but are not as ready to 
ascribe such a strong prediction.  
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3.3 Labor productivity.  
Voice increases the incentive to invest in a workforce since its tenure is more easily 
prolonged. It should therefore raise productivity. We therefore predict that voice should 
foster greater labor productivity than no voice. However, across voice regimes, 
differences may arise. Since the stronger or more embedded forms of voice, such as 
union voice, often impose restrictions on what management can do, there is likely to be 
benefit to a firm that can establish its own brand of voice (typically direct)  with or without 
union influence. Kim et al (2010;386) find team (direct) voice and representative voice 
interact negatively with productivity, so it may be that non-union only voice has the 
highest positive relationship with productivity. 
 
We refer once again to our simple version of equation (1) above, where labor 
productivity (LP) replaces turnover and: 
 
[6]                                     LPit  =  a it +  b1V it + b2X it + e 
 
is expected to yield a positive co-efficient b1 >0 for all voice types relative to no-voice.  
 
When we look at all the categories of voice, however, the order of voice coefficients 
would be expected to follow: 
 
[7]        LP it =b1 [(Non-Union Voice > Dual Voice >Union Voice >) it >(No Voice) it], 
 
where the forms of voice that reduce exit but also allow for more managerial 
experimentation and discretion may raise labor productivity the most.  
 
3.4 Financial performance.  
This is perhaps the most ambiguous of workplace outcomes in relation to voice. Voice 
entails an upfront investment and on-going cost, which only firms with financial ability will 
be able to pay, implying that the relation between financial performance and voice could 
be two-way (i.e. financially secure firms invest in voice, or vice versa) (Metcalf, 2003). 
Second, regardless of the specific causal linkages, in equilibrium, we would expect that 
workplaces should have optimally sorted themselves such that the returns to whatever 
particular voice regime is chosen would yield the same net benefits. This means that in 
 10 
equilibrium, we should observe very little variation in financial performance across 
workplaces with respect to the presence or absence of voice.   
 
To understand this interpretation we run a final estimation of financial performance (FP) 
as (1) above: 
 
[8]                                              FPit  =  a it +  b1V it + b2X it + e, 
 
where we expect our test of voice equilibrium to be either zero with the equality of all 
voice coefficients, including no-voice  (i.e., if the system of employee voice-choice in 
Britain over the period 1984-2004 was in equilibrium)  
 
[9.1]      FP it =b1 [(Union Voice ═ Dual Voice═ Non-Union Voice) it ═ (No Voice) it], 
 
or, if in disequilibrium,  a positive or negative direction of effects in particular periods will 
emerge across different voice regimes. The only clue we have as to which form(s) of 
voice may provide the greatest net-returns has been the spectacular rise in non-union 
direct forms of voice over the past 20 years in Britain. So we expect the positive relations 
to follow the following rank order: 
 
[9.2]     FP it =b1 [(Non-Union Voice > Dual Voice>Union Voice >) it > (No Voice) it]. 
 
Just as exit-voice is a hypothesis that provides for an unambiguous (negative) time 
invariant interpretation for the effect of voice on exit, so the test of equilibrium or 
disequilibrium in voice provision should provide an interpretation of the effect of voice 
and voice regimes on financial performance.  
 
 
4.  Voice and Workplace Practices.  
 
One way to assess the relative net benefits of a voice regime or type is to focus on 
outcomes, but the estimation of the performance consequence of any organisational 
practice or set thereof is complicated and the data available for the UK have substantial 
limitations. A second avenue involves the examination of associations between voice 
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regimes and types on the one hand and management practices on the other. 
Specifically, voice regimes may be differentially associated with and – perhaps – 
synergistic with other practices in the management of labor.   
 
One set of practices of interest is the set of human resource management practices 
(HRM) used at establishment level.  There is a literature associating such practices 
themselves with positive performance outcomes (Becker et al, 2001). There is also a 
literature arguing for and against relationships between bundles of such practices and 
particular voice regimes, particularly union voice (Guest 1989; Machin and Wood, 2005). 
The relationship between HRM and different voice regimes and types, however, has not 
been examined. It may be that one factor influencing voice choice is the compatibility 
between voice regimes and types on the one hand and HRM practices on the other. 
 
What factors might account for the variance and covariance of HRM and voice across 
workplaces?  Our hypotheses are as follows. We adopt the following simple notation: Let 
HRM (X) be the extent of HRM use given voice regime X, where X can be: A (absence 
of voice), U ( union voice), and N (non-union voice). U and N can be present 
concurrently in dual channel voice.  
 
HRM and voice may be complements or substitutes at the workplace. If HRM practices 
delivered everything voice representation did (and vice versa), they would be 
substitutes. Conversely, if the effectiveness of HRM is enhanced by the simultaneous 
presence of voice at a workplace (because, as we hypothesize above, voice reduces 
costly exit or increases the flow of productivity-enhancing information), the two would be 
complements and we would expect them to appear together. Concurrent use of voice 
and HRM could also originate from a common factor driving the adoption of both – for 
example managerial quality – that enables a firm to cope with organizational and 
managerial innovations more easily. In this case, we would again expect the two 
practices to appear in conjunction; a workplace that draws positive net benefits from one 
will also draw positive net benefits from the other (Bryson et al, 2007).  
 
The question of substitutability or complementarity is an empirical one but we view 
complementarity as more likely for several reasons. First, voice and HRM may be useful 
for different groups of employees, and in specialized organizations the productivity of 
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one group raises the marginal productivity of another (Kretschmer and Puranam, 2008). 
Second, we contend that voice and HRM are largely distinct sets and, as such, it is 
unlikely that one does everything the other does. Third, there is evidence that 
managerial quality drives use of good practice in several dimensions (Bloom et al., 
2008); voice and HRM may be manifestations of good management in different 
dimensions We therefore hypothesize: 
  
[10] HRM will be more prevalent in establishments with (any form of) voice than in those 
without voice (min[HRM(U), HRM(N), HRM(U,N)] > HRM(A)). 
 
The second point is that HRM may sit better with some forms of voice than others. HRM 
could partially substitute for union voice where HRM generates outcomes that reduce 
employee demand for unionization. The presence of union-only voice could also signal 
union success in monopolizing worker voice at the workplace and imply the potential to 
block HRM if the union is not persuaded by the ‘high performance’ ethos driving HRM 
adoption (Wood, 1996; Bryson et al., 2005). Union-only voice could also imply a reliance 
on collective rather than individual forms of employer-employee engagement that might 
exclude HRM. Using a narrow definition of union-only voice (rather than union presence 
which encompasses dual voice) we hypothesize, amending Machin and Wood (2005), 
that among workplaces with employee voice, HRM will be lowest in union-only voice 
regimes. 
 
[11] Within voice establishments, HRM will be less prevalent in workplaces with union 
only voice than in those with non-union voice present (min[HRM(N), HRM(U,N)] > 
HRM(U)). 
 
So far our hypotheses are consistent with the proposition that HRM incidence will 
increase in an ordinal fashion from no-voice to union voice to non-union voice regimes. 
If, as we hypothesize, union-only voice regimes restrict HRM and non-union only voice 
environments are more favorable, we must consider how dual voice and HRM coexist.  
 
Non-union voice exists where the employer has chosen to invest in its provision (Bryson 
et al., 2004). If the employer implements non-union voice, it may also invest in HRM to 
obtain a competitive advantage (Pfeffer, 1995). The presence of non-union voice 
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alongside union voice at a workplace is therefore indicative of one of two scenarios, both 
of which are conducive to HRM. It may either signal union weakness, leaving the 
employer largely unconstrained in mixing voice with HRM, or a ‘mutual gains’ 
environment in which unions use their ‘voice face’ to elicit productivity improvements 
(Freeman and Medoff, 1984).  
 
Dual voice regimes may therefore emerge in different ways. For some firms, non-union 
voice may be added to union-only regimes in response to employers perceiving 
deficiencies in union-only voice provision. The reverse is also possible where employees 
press for unionization in addition to non-union voice. In Britain the former is more 
common.3. It is thus likely that in a dual-voice regime workplaces can adopt HRM 
practices freely. We therefore hypothesize: 
 
[12] HRM intensity in dual channel voice regimes will be greater than or equal to that in 
non-union only voice regimes (HRM(U, N) ≥ HRM(N)). 
 
To summarize, our hypotheses on the incidence of voice and HRM can be expressed in 
the following ordinal ranking: HRM(U, N) ≥  HRM(N) > HRM(U) > HRM(A).   
 
 
5. Data and Measures 
 
The Workplace Employment Relations Surveys (WERS) are nationally representative 
surveys of British workplaces conducted in 1980, 1984, 1990, 1998 and 2004. The key 
features are described in detail elsewhere (Millward et al., 2000, 3-10; 248-55; Kersley et 
al 2006). Although we are reliant on a single managerial respondent for all data our 
respondents are particularly well-informed as it is the manager responsible for workplace 
industrial relations who is sampled.  In the majority of cases, practices are known to 
cover either the largest occupation (what we term ‘core’ employees) or a high 
percentage of all non-managerial employees (as in the case of appraisals). Observations 
                                                 
3
 Earlier cohorts of workplaces initially adopted union-voice whereas newer workplaces adopted 
non-union only voice (Millward et al., 2000; Willman et al., 2007). Few unionized workplaces have 
de-recognized (de-certified) their unions in Britain; instead, they supplement union with non-union 
voice (Millward et al., 2000; Kersley et al., 2006). 
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are weighted by the inverse of the workplace’s probability of selection in the survey. With 
these weights, our analyses provide a representative portrait of British workplaces. 
 
- Table 2- 
 
 5.1 Measuring Voice 
The set of voice mechanisms are depicted in Table 2. They were originally used in 
Millward et al’s. (2000) analysis of voice in Britain and have been used extensively since. 
Items 1-2 measure union voice, while items 3-7 measure non-union voice. Voice 
workplaces have at least one of these mechanisms in place whereas no-voice 
workplaces are defined by the absence of all. 
 
5.2 Measuring performance 
The performance measures are as follows 
1. Quit rates; measured since 1990, the percent of employees who resigned or left 
in the previous year. 
2. Climate, managers are asked “how would you rate the relationship between 
management and employees generally at this workplace?”  Subjective ratings range 
from “very poor” to “very good” 
3. Strikes, managers were asked whether there has been any form of industrial 
action at the workplace in the last 12 months (excluding lock-outs).   
4. Productivity; since 1990 managers rate labor productivity relative to the industry 
average, on a scale running from “a lot below average” to “a lot above average.”  For the 
regression analysis this is collapsed into a three-way variable identifying workplaces 
identifying themselves as “below average”, “average” and “above average”.   
5.  Financial performance relative to the industry average, measured in the same 
way as labor productivity.   
 
5.3 Measuring HRM 
Defining a set of practices based on an established definition of HRM is difficult given 
the many definitions in the literature (Kaufman, 2004).  Our primary HRM measure in 
table 3 (‘Full HRM’) is based on a set of 13 practices common to the HRM literature 
(Kochan and Dyer, 2001). It is a count of practices identified by Pfeffer(1995) and others 
(Brewster, 1995; Nolan and O’Donnell, 2003).  
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-Table 3- 
 
A count of 13 denotes affirmative answers to each of the HRM questions. Lacking any 
one of these HRM variables would give an establishment a count of 12 and so on.  
 
Two of the items in our Full HRM measure (self-managed teams and information 
sharing) entail some two-way communication between employees and management and 
thus bias our estimated associations with voice upwards.  We test the sensitivity of our 
results by excluding these two items from our original HRM score. We call this 11 count 
measure “Core HRM” to distinguish it from our Full 13 Count measure. Estimates are 
carried out with both measures and compared. 
 
For the practice measures, we have used the WERS survey for 1998. The rationale here 
is to measure practice diffusion at the end of a long period of voluntarism; from 1979- 
1997, a Conservative government oversaw an industrial relations regime in which 
compulsion to adopt specific practices or institutions was almost completely absent 
(Willman and Bryson, 2007). The 1998 survey thus mapped arrangements at the end of 
this period of employer choice. In 2000, the UK began implementation of EU legislation 
mandating information disclosure and consultation, and it is likely that the 2004 survey 
results reflect this statute. 
 
- Table 4- 
 
 
6. Estimated Voice and Workplace Outcome Equations 
 
The results are based on pooled and separate year regressions that control for single-
digit industry, region, foreign ownership, age of establishment, single establishment, 
workforce composition (percentage of females, non-manuals and part-timers), and 
workplace size. The empirical analysis identifies independent associations between 
voice regimes and workplace outcomes.  Multivariate analyses imply that we are 
comparing those associations across observationally equivalent workplaces.  We test for 
the statistical significance of differences across our four voice regimes (no voice; union 
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only voice; dual voice; and union only voice) in relation to outcome measures, as well as 
the joint significance of the voice coefficients.  
 
6.1  Estimated Exit-Voice Relations 
Panel A of Table 4 shows that quit rates were lowest in workplaces with union voice, a 
result that persists throughout the period. 4  In 1990 the regime with the lowest quit rates 
was union-only voice.  However, quit rates rose in these workplaces through to 2004, 
whereas they fell in dual channel workplaces such that, at the end of the period, quit 
rates were lowest in dual channel workplaces.   Contrary to expectations, quit rates were 
higher in non-union only voice workplaces than they were in no voice workplaces, 
although their quit rates had converged by 2004. To establish whether voice regimes 
had an independent association with quit rates we ran regression analyses controlling 
for workplace characteristics.  The results are in Panel A of Table 5. 
 
- Table 5   - 
 
They confirm the descriptive results.  In the pooled years regressions both union 
regimes had significantly lower quit rates than non-union only and no voice regimes. In 
the single year regressions only dual channel voice is significantly associated with lower 
quits than the no voice regime.  Relative to non-union voice only, both union only and 
dual channel voice regimes were associated with lower quit rates in the pooled years’ 
regression analysis and for separate year regressions in 1990 and 1998, though in 2004 
it is only true for dual channel versus non-union only voice. The general pattern is that 
union voice variables are negatively related to quit rates in the British private sector.  
 
In Panel A of Table 6, a similar pattern emerges with respect to representative versus 
direct forms of voice. Although no type consistently outperforms no voice, representative 
voice has consistently lower quit rates compared to direct voice; these differences are 
usually statistically significant in both the pooled and specific year regressions. It 
appears that more embedded voice is associated with fewer quits. 
 
- Table 6- 
                                                 
4
 We have removed outliers with quit rates greater than 110% but their inclusion does not change 
the results appreciably. 
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6.2 Estimated Industrial Climate and Industrial Action 
The percentage of workplaces reporting ‘very good’ climate tends to be higher with non-
union voice and is poorest in union-only workplaces (Panel B of Table 4).  Non-union 
only voice is also associated with the best perceptions of climate although climate in 
these workplaces has been deteriorating at a faster rate than in other workplaces. 
 
Table 5 Panel B presents coefficients from ordered probit regressions for climate 
collapsed into a three-way variable in which 1=poor/average 2=good and 3=very good. 
In the pooled regression results, the presence of non-union only voice is associated with 
better climate than no voice and union-only voice.  However, reflecting the descriptive 
results, the gap has closed over time;  whereas non-union only voice was associated 
with significantly better climate than both union-only voice and dual channel voice in 
1984, this was no longer the case by 2004.  Indeed, the voice measures were no longer 
jointly significant by 2004.  
 
 Direct voice is associated with the best climate responses amongst managers (Panel B 
of Table 6). In pooled years, direct voice is associated with better climate than 
representative-only voice and no voice, but there are no significant differences between 
direct voice only and regimes that combine representative and direct voice. Thus 
perceived climate is best when the voice regime includes direct voice.  These relations 
do change over time however, as direct only voice is not the ‘best’ type from 1990 
onwards.  Indeed in 1998 the combination of representative and direct voice is 
associated with better climate than other voice.  By 2004 there are no significant 
differences across any types.5 
 
On strikes, (Table 4 Panel C) there has been an overall reduction in industrial action 
across all workplaces. Not surprisingly, union-based regimes are associated with a 
higher probability of industrial action than non-union voice only and no voice.  This is 
confirmed statistically in Panel C of Table 5 regression analyses for the pooled years 
                                                 
5
 In results not reported here, when we split the voice regimes into their components and run the 
same regressions the only statistically significant effect is the positive effect of having regular 
meetings between senior managers and all sections of the workforce. 
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and in separate regressions for 1984-1990.6 If one re-runs the regression analyses 
separately identifying constituents of the voice typology (in results not reported here), 
workplaces with unions recognised for pay bargaining continue to have a higher 
probability of industrial action than otherwise ‘like’ non-unionised workplaces in 2004. 
This reinforces the corollary to the exit-voice hypothesis, that by establishing voice, 
conflict is internalised through action rather than being externalised through higher 
turnover.  
 
6.3  Estimated Labor Productivity 
Labor productivity is highest in non-union only voice workplaces and lowest in union-only 
regimes.  The gap is most pronounced in 2004 (Table 4 Panel D).  In pooled regressions 
for regimes (Table 5 Panel D), none of the voice regimes outperform no voice 
workplaces.  However, union only voice is associated with lower productivity than non-
union only voice (-0.27, t=2.29)7.   Dual channel voice is also associated with lower labor 
productivity than non-union only voice, though the differential effect is only on the 
margins of statistical significance (-0.18, t=1.93).  Separate year models are less clear 
cut as no statistically significant differences across voice regimes exist and no obvious  
time trends emerge. The findings on type of voice are inconclusive, all coefficients being 
weak and non –significant. 
 
6.4 Estimated Financial Performance  
Panel E in Table 4 indicates a clear association between a workplace’s financial 
performance and its voice regime.  Non-union voice is associated with better financial 
performance than union-only voice in all years, often by a wide margin.  The 
performance of dual channel regime workplaces improved markedly over the period.  In 
the pooled regression estimates in Panel E of Table 5 non-union only voice performs 
better than all other regimes.   However, the coefficients for the other three regimes are 
virtually identical, suggesting some kind of separated equilibrium. The effects are very 
clear in the early 1980s, disappear in 1990s, but return once again in 2004.  
                                                 
6
 It was not possible to run an analysis for 1998 due to the very low incidence of industrial action 
in that year. 
 
7
 Asterisks in the tables denote statistically significant differences relative to no voice 
workplaces.We checked for statistically significant differences between voice regimes other than 
the no voice reference category using STATA’s LINCOM command which computes point 
estimates and t- statistics for linear combinations of coefficients. 
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Interestingly, as one would predict if equilibrium processes were at work, over the entire 
period, differences between the other 3 voice regimes are not statistically significant. 
 
In Table 6 Panel E, direct voice only appears to perform better than others and 
representative only voice performs particularly poorly.  In pooled regressions for all years 
we find that direct only voice is positively associated with financial performance as 
compared to no-voice and union-only voice, but it is not significantly different from the 
combination of direct and representative voice. In the 1984 regression direct only voice 
‘outperforms’ all other regimes including the combination of direct and representative 
voice but, by 2004, the only significant difference is the significantly better performance 
of direct-only voice over ‘no voice’. 
 
In summary, then, we find that union voice is associated with higher conflict and lower 
quits, confirming previous findings. Non-union voice, however, is associated with better 
climate and, in some instances, with better financial performance. There is thus some 
limited evidence of an incentive for employers to invest in non-union voice. 
 
7. Voice and HRM 
 
Table 7 reports descriptive statistics on the use of HRM practices, overall and 
disaggregated by workplace characteristics.  Columns 1 and 2 report results for our Full 
HRM (13 count) and Core HRM (11 count) measures. Establishments used an average 
of 6.9 out of 13 HRM practices and 5.3 out of 11 core HRM practices. HRM incidence 
differs considerably across workplaces with small, single-establishment, family owned, 
and private sector and establishments using fewer HRM practices than larger, non-
family owned, and public sector establishments.    
Table 7 
 
7.1 Descriptive Results 
Table 7 supports the contention that establishments with voice use more HRM practices. 
Moreover, as is evident in Table 7 row 1, HRM intensity varies significantly across voice 
regimes. In keeping with [11], union-only voice has the lowest HRM score among 
workplaces with voice. HRM scores are highest in dual channel workplaces followed by 
those with non-union only voice. This finding is consistent with Black and Lynch’s (20010 
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finding based on US data that unionized establishments with both non-union voice and 
some HRM practices such as incentive pay have higher productivity than union only 
ones. Positive union/HRM interactions have also been observed in UK data (Bryson et al 
2005). 
 
Table 8 column A shows HRM practice incidence by workplaces with and without voice. 
Almost every practice is more likely to be found in a workplace that also has voice. The 
exception is the use of incentives, perhaps indicating a more transactional set of 
relationships in no-voice regimes. Table 8 column B presents the same set of 13 
practices tabulated against voice regime. Establishments with dual voice have a greater 
incidence of most HRM practices, although establishments with non-union only voice are 
more likely to use incentive pay and formal appraisals.  
 
Godard (2004) argues that certain practices conventionally described as new HRM 
practices were in fact commonplace and longstanding attributes of unionized firms: 
examples are job security (or no compulsory redundancy agreements), internal 
promotion (internal labor markets) and information sharing. We are able to comment on 
the relationship between specific HRM practices and the presence of unions; the data 
are presented in Table 8. Panel B indicates that union only workplaces are much less 
likely than those with some non-union voice to have job security provisions, incentive 
pay, internal promotion and formal appraisal systems. This perhaps explains the upper 
end compression of the union distribution in Figure 3; i.e. there are specific HRM 
practices absent where unions monopolise voice. But dual voice workplaces are also 
more likely than either union or non-union only workplaces to have several items, 
including job enrichment and self managed teams.  
 
As Godard argues, union only workplaces are very likely to have information sharing; but 
we also find that they are likely to have self managed teams. This has two implications. 
First, it may explain the lower end compression in figure 3; i.e. there are few union only 
workplaces with very low HRM scores because some of the items have long association 
with unionized establishments. Second,  these items are those excluded from our core 
HRM measure, so we have fallen back on the core rather than full HRM definitions in 
Figure 3. This narrower core specification of HRM does not yield different results.” 
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-Table 8-  
-Figure 3- 
The descriptive relationships presented here are in line with our hypotheses. However, 
they may be driven by other observables (such as systematic workplace size differences 
between voice and no-voice workplaces), which are also correlated with HRM incidence. 
We therefore control for workplace size, age, sector, industry, ownership, organizational 
affiliations and being part of a multi-establishment network. 
 
7.2 Multivariate Results 
Table 9 reports the association between varieties of voice (including no voice) and HRM 
use across our ‘Full HRM’ (column 1) and ’Core HRM’ (column 2) measures with control 
variables in place. The results are qualitatively the same for both, with coefficients 
slightly falling in magnitude in our Core HRM estimates, owing to the smaller overall 
mean of the dependent variable.  
- Table 9 - 
There is robust support for our hypotheses regarding the links between HRM and voice 
in both our Full and Core HRM estimates (Table 9, row 1, columns 1 and 2). Treated as 
a single entity, voice and HRM are still positively correlated (the voice categories are 
jointly significant at 5% level), supporting [10].8 However, across voice regimes, HRM is 
less prevalent in union-only regimes (Table 9, row 1). Controlling for observable 
differences across workplaces, HRM is no more prevalent in union-only regimes than in 
no-voice regimes. Not surprisingly, the difference between union-only workplaces and 
those with non-union voice is significant in both columns, confirming [11]. Although dual 
voice workplaces have the highest use of HRM practices in both columns, the 
coefficients are not significantly different from those for non-union only voice so [12] is 
only weakly confirmed.  
 
8. Conclusions 
 
 
                                                 
8
 If one replaces the four-way voice variable with a dummy variable identifying the presence of 
employee voice it has a coefficient of 0.47 and a t-statistic of 2.16. 
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This paper has looked at voice types and regimes and tried to examine whether 
variations in voice provision across firms are associated with two kinds of comparative 
advantage for employers; first, better performance outcomes and second, greater use of 
HRM practices. The background conditions are a sustained commitment of employers to 
voice, but substantial change across the period in both voice types and regimes. The 
findings are as follows. 
 
Quits are lower in union only settings and in dual representation settings.  This is what 
would be predicted by the exit voice model. On other outcome measures, based on 
management perceptions, the presence of non-union voice seems to be associated with 
better perceived outcomes. The picture on HRM facilitation also indicates that where 
non-union voice is present, there is greater use of HRM. Where there is non-union voice, 
alone or in a dual system, outcomes and HRM usage are greater than for union-only 
voice or no voice employers.  However, both sets of findings point to a paradox.  
 
The most common regime/type combination in 1984 was dual/representative; in 2004, it 
was non-union/direct. However, on these data, the expanding coverage of non-
union/direct voice is not easy to explain in performance terms. There were no consistent 
significant differences between dual/representative and non-union/direct voice on 
productivity, and in the later years dual/representative systems were not significantly 
different in financial performance from direct/non-union only voice. Furthermore, the dual 
system performs better in terms of quits and does a good job in supporting the use of 
HRM. In contrast, union-only voice is the regime least supportive of HRM. 
 
Since dual system firms appear to have improved their performance relative to non-
union/direct voice firms over the period, something other than performance must be 
driving this trend toward non-union voice. Two possibilities occur. First, employers may 
find management of a dual system more complex than a non-union only system; the 
latter may economize on managerial time. Second, it may be that the direct costs of a 
dual system are greater than a non-union only system; into these costs one needs to put 
the possibly small but still present cost of a strike.  
 
Our data have some considerable limitations. They allow us to look at benefits and 
outcomes but not at voice costs. We have employed very broad definitions of two 
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central, contested, concepts, voice and HRM, aware that they may overlap. However, 
we have a very similar story to tell about the comparative advantages of non-union voice 
whether the dependent variable is performance or management practice. 
 
There are a number of avenues for further research. This aggregated data set runs only 
to 2004. After that, it is likely that the no-voice sector will shrink markedly under the 
impact of the EU Directive on Information and Consultation. The disappearance of our 
omitted reference category may affect relations between the variables under study. This 
can be tested with data from the next survey. At the micro level, we need better to 
understand the dynamics of interplay between voice elements, practices and 
performance outcomes in order to understand how, in the increasing proportion of 
workplaces without unions or representation, employers design voice for competitive 
advantage.  
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Table 1: 
Incidence (%) of Voice Types in Britain, Private Workplaces, 1980-2004 
 
 
 
All Workplaces 
 
 
 
Year 
1980 1984 1990 1998 2004 
 
Diff* 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [5]-[1] 
 
Panel A: Employer Provided Voice 
 
 
Representative Voice 
 
 
1. Any on-site Joint Consultative 
Committee (JCC) 
 
30 
 
26 
 
20 
 
24 
 
21 
 
 
-9 
 
2. On-site JCC that meets at least 
once a month (“Functioning” JCC) 
 
26 
 
24 
 
18 
 
19 
 
15 
 
 
-11 
 
3. Non-union on-site employee 
representatives†  
 
NA 
 
NA 
 
10 
 
12 
 
16 
 
+6 
 
Direct Voice 
 
 
4. Regular meetings between senior 
managers and all sections of 
workforce 
 
 
NA 
 
 
34 
 
 
39 
 
 
34 
 
 
36 
 
 
 
+2 
 
5. Team briefings 
 
NA 
 
31 
 
42 
 
49 
 
70 
 
 
+39 
 
6. Problem solving groups 
 
NA 
 
NA 
 
70 
 
61 
 
72 
 
+2 
 
Panel B: Union Provided Voice 
 
 
7.Any union members 
 
60 
 
58 
 
49 
 
36 
 
37 
 
 
-23 
 
8.Any recognised union 
 
50 
 
48 
 
38 
 
24 
 
22 
 
 
-28 
 
9.Any on-site union lay 
representative 
 
38 
 
38 
 
26 
 
16 
 
13 
 
-25 
Notes:  †Excluding health and safety. *For values with no 1980 data latest time period is 
chosen for difference. 
Source: WERS survey various waves. 
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Table 2: Voice Measures and Definitions 
 
 
Measure 
 
Definition 
 
A. Union Voice 
 
 
Presence of items 1 and/or 2 
 
1. Union recognition 
 
Presence of a union recognized for the purposes of 
collective bargaining 
 
 
2. Union representative(s)  
 
Presence of one or more union representatives on 
or off site. 
 
 
B. Non-Union Voice 
 
 
Presence of any items 3 through 7. 
 
3. Joint consultative committee  
 
Committees of managers and employees at this 
workplace primarily concerned with consultation, 
rather than negotiation 
 
 
4. Non-union representation 
 
Presence of a non-union employee representative 
on site. 
 
 
5. Problem solving groups 
 
Groups set up for the purposes of solving specific 
workplace problems. 
 
 
6. Regular Employer-Employee Meetings 
 
Regular meetings which allow for two-way 
communication and deliberation. 
 
 
7. Regular Team Briefings 
 
Meetings that occur at least once a month that 
devote time to employees’ 
concerns/questions/views. 
 
 
C. Dual Voice 
 
 
Any combination of items 1-2 and 3-7. 
 
D. No-Voice 
 
Absence of any items 1 through 7. 
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Table 3: HRM Measures and Definitions 
 
Measure 
Definition 
 
1. Strategic planning 
 
An indicator that the workplace has a formal strategic plan, 
strategic planning being a key component of HRM  
 
 
2. Job security 
 
 
Policy of guaranteed job security for at least some employees 
 
3. Selective recruitment 
 
 
Where manager says skills, qualifications, experience and 
motivation are all important factors in recruiting new employees 
 
 
4. ESOP scheme 
 
 
Employee share ownership scheme 
 
5. Incentive pay 
 
 
Profit pay, performance related payments or cash bonuses 
 
6. On-going training 
 
 
On-going training is one of the main methods by which core 
employees are made aware of their job responsibilities 
 
 
7. Symbolic egalitarianism 
 
 
Core employees have standard contracts for all non-pay terms 
and conditions of employment 
 
 
8. Internal promotion  
 
Internal applicants given preference when filling vacancies. 
 
 
9. Formal appraisal system  
 
 
The existence of a widespread appraisal system, that is, where 
at least 80% of core employees are formally appraised. 
 
 
10. Job Enrichment 
 
 
At least some core workers are formally trained to do jobs other 
than their own 
 
 
11. Empowerment 
 
 
Core employees have a lot of control over variety in their work, 
discretion over how they do their work or control over the pace 
at which they do their work 
 
 
12. Information sharing * 
 
 
Management shares information on investment, financial 
position of the organization or staffing* 
 
 
13. Self-managed teams * 
 
 
Core employees work in teams that are able to appoint their 
own leaders, jointly decide how work is done, or have 
responsibility for specific products or services* 
Starred * Items refer to HRM measures that we exclude from our definition of Core HRM. 
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Table 4:  
Outcomes by Voice Regimes in British Private Sector Workplaces, 1984-2004 
 
 
 
Year 
1984 1990 1998 2004 Differen
ce 
Change 
[1] [2] [3] [4] No 
Voice* 
[4]-[1] 
 
Panel A  
 
Outcome: Turnover (Percentage of Employee Quits) 
1. By No Voice NA 13.9 17.6 18.64 -- 4.7 
2. By Union  Only Voice NA 8.2 13.2 12.1 -6.5 3.9 
3. By Dual Voice NA 12.9 12.7 10.6 -8.0 -2.3 
4. By Non-Union Only 
Voice 
NA 
17.1 
20.3 18.3 -0.3 1.2 
 
Panel B 
 
Outcome: Industrial Climate (Percentage Reporting “Very 
Good” Climate) 
1. By No Voice 44.8 32.9 35.3 38.8 -- -6.0 
2. By Union  Only Voice 30.8 35.6 31.4 33.5 -5.4 2.7 
3. By Dual Voice 36.7 24.8 41.0 33.0 -5.8 -3.7 
4. By Non-Union Only 
Voice 54.8 
39.1 40.0 40.2 1.4 -14.6 
 
Panel C 
 
Outcome: Industrial Action (Percentage of Workplaces 
Reporting Any Industrial Action in Last 12 months) 
1. By No Voice 0.50 0.4 0.0 0.80 -- 0.3 
2. By Union  Only Voice 20.6 6.4 2.8 7.1 6.3 -13.5 
3. By Dual Voice 19.6 12.8 3.9 4.1 3.3 -15.5 
4. By Non-Union Only 
Voice 
0.20 1.4 0.0 2.0 1.2 1.8 
 
Panel D 
 
Outcome: Labor Productivity (Percentage of Workplaces 
Reporting Above Average Labor Productivity) 
1. By No Voice NA 48.5 44.1 51.5 -- 3.0 
2. By Union  Only Voice NA 38.2 43.7 43.1 -8.4 4.9 
3. By Dual Voice NA 46.5 51.2 43.3 -8.2 -3.2 
4. By Non-Union Only 
Voice 
NA 50.8 51.0 59.3 7.8 8.5 
 
Panel E 
 
Outcome: Financial Performance (Percentage of Workplaces 
Reporting Above Average Financial Performance) 
1. By No Voice 41.0 55.8 56.3 45.8 -- 4.8 
2. By Union  Only Voice 42.6 53.1 56.4 41.3 -4.5 -1.3 
3. By Dual Voice 40.7 62.6 57.9 53.2 7.4 12.5 
4. By Non-Union Only 
Voice 
60.8 54.2 63.7 63.6 17.8 2.8 
*Differences in voice categories with respect to No Voice are calculated with most recent 
end of period (2004) values. 
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Table 5:  
Estimates of Voice Regimes on Outcomes in British Private Sector Workplaces 
 
 
 
Year 
Expecte
d 
Sign 
Pooled 1984 1990 1998 2004 
1 2 3 4 5 
Panel A  Dependent Variable: Turnover† 
1. [No Voice]       
2. Union  Only Voice <0 -4.29** NA -3.76 -6.07 -5.29 
3. Dual Voice <0 -4.67** NA -0.94 -8.15** -7.27** 
4. Non-Union Only Voice <0 0.58 NA 2.18 -1.61 0.30 
Panel B  Dependent Variable: Industrial Climate†† 
1. [No Voice]       
2. Union  Only Voice <0 -0.09 -0.31 -0.05 -0.01 -0.08 
3. Dual Voice <0 0.07 -0.10 -0.10 0.37* 0.15 
4. Non-Union Only Voice >0 0.19* 0.24 0.22 0.23 0.15 
Panel C  Dependent Variable: Industrial Action††† 
1.[No Voice]       
2. Union  Only Voice >0 1.21** 1.61** 1.07** NA 0.65 
3. Dual Voice >0 1.28** 1.62** 1.52**  NA 0.44 
4. Non-Union Only Voice =0 0.45 -0.58 0.58 NA 0.25 
Panel D  Dependent Variable: Labor Productivity†††† 
1. [No Voice]       
2. Union  Only Voice <0 -0.15 NA -0.28 -0.08 -0.07 
3. Dual Voice >=0 -0.05 NA -0.06 0.05 -0.06 
4. Non-Union Only Voice >0 0.12 NA 0.04 0.05 0.24 
Panel E  Dependent Variable: Financial Performance††††† 
1. [No Voice]       
2. Union  Only Voice <0 0.00 0.08 0.05 -0.01 -0.14 
3. Dual Voice >0 -0.00 -0.14 0.09 0.14 -0.01 
4. Non-Union Only Voice >0 0.17* 0.50** -0.13 0.15 0.32* 
Notes: Cells in columns 1-5 are coefficients and variables in [ ] are omitted reference 
category. All specifications (panels A to E) control for single-digit industry, region, foreign 
ownership, age of establishment, single establishment, workforce composition 
(percentage of females, non-manuals and part-timers), and workplace size. All 
regressions are survey-weighted. Full results are available from the authors on request. 
* indicates 5% and ** 1% significance.†Turnover (measured as quits) was estimated 
using Tobit regressions to account for the left-censoring of the data at zero. †† Industrial 
climate was estimated using ordered probit where 1=poor/average 2=good 3=very good.  
Although 1998 data are included in pooled estimates, the single year estimates for 1998 
are omitted due to the very low incidence of industrial action that year.††† Industrial 
action was estimated using probit for any industrial action in the previous 12 months. 
†††† Labor productivity was estimated using ordered probits for labor productivity 
relative to the industry average where 1=below average 2=average 3=above average.  
These data were not collected in 1984.††††† Financial performance was estimated 
using ordered probit for financial performance relative to the industry average where 
1=below average 2=average 3=above average 
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Table 6 
Estimates of Voice Types on Outcomes in British Private Sector Workplaces 
 
 
 
Year 
Expecte
d 
Sign 
Pooled 1984 1990 1998 2004 
1 2 3 4 5 
Panel A  Dependent Variable: Turnover 
1. [No Voice]       
2. Direct  Only Voice <0 0.29 NA 1.98 -2.14 0.30 
3. Direct & Representative 
Voice 
<0 -2.74 NA -0.16 -4.64 -5.62* 
4. Representative Only Voice <0 -2.93 NA -2.21 -5.33* -2.60 
Panel B  Dependent Variable: Industrial Climate 
1. [No Voice]       
2. Direct  Only Voice >0 0.18* 0.34 0.21 0.18 0.14 
3. Direct & Representative 
Voice 
>0 0.16 -0.03 -0.02 0.45** 0.23 
4. Representative Only Voice <0 -0.05 -0.32* 0.04 0.06 -0.02 
Panel C Dependent Variable: Industrial action 
1. [No Voice]       
2. Direct  Only Voice =0 0.53 -0.51 0.72 NA 0.20 
3. Direct & Representative 
Voice 
>0 1.15** 1.50** 1.32** NA 0.50 
4. Representative Only Voice >0 1.07** 1.49** 0.94* NA 0.51 
Panel D  Dependent Variable: Labor Productivity 
1. [No Voice]       
2. Direct  Only Voice >0 0.12 NA -0.03 0.09 0.23 
3. Direct & Representative 
Voice 
>0 0.03 NA 0.06 0.08 0.00 
4. Representative Only Voice =0 -0.10 NA -0.22 -0.19 0.14 
Panel E  Dependent Variable: Financial Performance 
1. [No Voice]       
2. Direct  Only Voice >0 0.19* 0.58** -0.13 0.18 0.31* 
3. Direct & Representative 
Voice 
>0 0.07 -0.06 0.07 0.25 0.12 
4. Representative Only Voice =0 -0.03 0.06 -0.02 -0.19 -0.06 
Notes: Cells in columns 1-5 are coefficients and variables in [ ] are omitted reference 
category. Full results are available from the authors on request. See footnote to Table 5 
for details of controls, dependent variables and notation.   
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Table 7: Average HRM Count by Selected Workplace Characteristics. 
 Mean Full HRM 
Count (13 item 
max)[1] 
Mean Core HRM 
Count  
(11 item max)[2] 
 All Workplaces  6.7 5.2 
1. By Type of Voice    
No Voice 5.7 4.4 
Union-only 6.1 4.5 
Non-Union Only 6.9 5.4 
Dual Channel 7.4 5.7 
2. By Establishment size (employees)   
10-24 6.4 5.0 
25-49 6.7 5.2 
50-99 7.1 5.4 
100-199 7.5 5.7 
200-499 7.9 6.0 
500+ 8.0 6.1 
3. By Ownership   
Foreign 7.1 5.6 
Domestic 6.7 5.2 
Joint Venture  5.8 3.9 
4. By Establishment   
Single 5.8 4.4 
Multi-establishment 7.4 5.8 
5. By Size of Multi-Establishment Network   
Single 5.8 4.4 
2-10 7.0 5.4 
11-50 6.9 5.4 
51+ 8.1 6.4 
6. By Organization Size   
Small [<50] 6.4 5.0 
Large [51+] 8.3 6.5 
7. By Establishment Age   
<3 years 6.2 4.7 
3-19 years 7.1 5.5 
20+ years 6.2 4.9 
8. By Ownership   
Family owned/controlled 5.9 4.6 
Other 7.1 5.5 
9. By Employer Association Status   
Yes 6.6 5.1 
No 6.6 5.1 
10. By Number of Organizational Affiliations   
0 6.6 5.1 
1 6.4 5.0 
2 6.8 5.3 
3 7.0 5.4 
4 7.7 5.9 
11. By Franchise Status   
Franchise 6.7 5.2 
Non-franchise 6.8 5.2 
Number of Observations 1369 
Source: WERS 1998. 
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Table 8: Incidence of HRM practices by all workplaces and by type of workplace voice 
(%). 
 
 
 
 
HRM Practices 
 
A. By All Workplaces 
 
B. By Voice Workplaces Only 
 
 
No Voice 
 
 
Voice 
 
Union 
Only 
 
Dual  
Channel 
Non-
Union  
Only 
 
1. Strategic planning 
 
43.5 72.6 67.4 77.3 71.7 
2. Job Security 
 
6.1 7.4 0.1 9.7 7.2 
3. Selective Recruitment  
 
48.7 52.1 49.5 57.2 50.9 
4. ESOP Scheme 
 
12.0 17.0 14.3 27.8 14.3 
5. Incentive Pay 
 
52.3 62.4 35.9 60.5 64.6 
6. Ongoing Training 
 
54.2 68.7 68.0 62.1 70.5 
7. Symbolic egalitarianism 
 
19.9 39.8 35.3 33.1 41.9 
8. Internal Promotion 
 
25.6 26.0 8.2 30.5 26.0 
9. Formal Appraisal System  
 
35.9 57.6 36.9 57.0 59.2 
10. Job Enrichment 
 
64.1 70.1 54.8 82.0 68.0 
11. Empowerment 
 
72.2 60.0 55.5 58.6 60.7 
12. Information Sharing* 
 
65.3 81.5 84.6 81.5 81.3 
13. Self-Managed Teams* 
 
59.2 74.8 78.0 84.3 72.1 
Number of Observations 132 
(0.22) 
1059 
(0.78) 
34 
(0.04) 
406 
(0.16) 
619 
(0.59) 
 
Notes  Numbers in parentheses refer to sample proportions. Starred items * are omitted from our 
core HRM definition.  
Source; WERS  1998. 
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Table 9: The Determinants of HRM Intensity at the Workplace, OLS Regressions.  
 
 Dependent variable: 
Full HRM (13 count) 
(1) 
Dependent variable: 
Core HRM (11 count) 
(2) 
Dep. Var. Mean 6.7 5.2 
  
Coefficient 
 
t-stat 
 
Coefficient 
 
t-stat 
 
1.Type of Voice [No Voice] 
 
 
   
Union only -0.39 -1.01 -0.68* 1.87 
Non-Union only 0.66** 2.10 0.43 1.46 
Dual Channel 0.78*** 2.95 0.57** 2.49 
 
2. Workplace Size
† 
[10-24 employees] 
    
25-49 0.15 0.63 0.11 0.55 
50-99 0.41* 1.70 0.21 0.98 
100-199 0.77*** 3.01 0.47** 2.06 
200-499 0.83*** 3.06 0.53** 2.17 
500+ 1.10*** 3.22 0.75** 2.51 
 
3. Age of Establishment [21+ yrs] 
    
10-20 0.65*** 2.53 0.44* 1.93 
5-9 0.62*** 2.43 0.33 1.51 
3-4 1.02*** 2.79 0.75** 2.17 
<3 0.27 0.80 -0.01 0.02 
 
4. Size of Establishment Network [Single] 
    
2-10 1.07*** 3.99 0.83*** 3.68 
11-50 0.77*** 3.25 0.77*** 3.69 
51+ 1.51*** 4.83 1.37*** 4.91 
Intercept 4.45*** 10.99 3.57*** 10.09 
Observations 1193 1193 
R-squared 0.34 0.31 
Notes: Models also control for number of employer affiliations, ownership structure 
(foreign, family-owned, franchise) and industry. Regression tables with 
coefficients for these controls are available on request  
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Figure 1: 
Share (%) of Voice Regimes in Britain, Private Sector, 1984-2004 
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Figure 2: 
Share (%) of Employer Provided Voice Types in Britain, 1980-2004 
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Note: Dark lines refer to non-union direct voice. Dotted lines represent non-union representative 
voice. JCC refers to Joint Consultative Committee.  
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 Figure 3; Voice Type and HRM; Core Measure 
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Number of HRM practices (0 to 13) 
